Making sense of Pakistan

It's something that even Hillary Clinton failed to do, but I thought I'd give it a shot.

It's not always great to see bombs and suicide bombers go off in your neighbourhood, is it ? But that is the unfortunate and the undeniable reality in India's neighbour, Pakistan today. A very weak civilian-government is in charge, yet invisible in many ways, overshadowed by the real authority, the Army which is waging a war, which could well determine Pakistan's future as a country (I wouldn't call it a nation yet, as even Pakistan's very own Shuja Nawaz thinks so). The problems, as we all know are multi-fold, yet terrorism is seen through a smokescreen, well and truly differentiated and categorized depending on who they fight and who the enemy really is. However, what they're missing out on is a comprehensive policy on fighting terrorism within the country, in dire contradiction to how they resorted to terror as not a strategy, but a state policy (and still do, against India and Afghanistan).

Military operations are pretty much alright and it's always fair to discuss strategy and tactic, but where is the policy, I ask ? And the answer I get, from some of the Pakistanis I have interacted with recently, is there isn't any. And, it's not just the places where the writ of the Pakistan Government claims to not exist, where there is a problem. It's well and truly within their eye-lines, at the very heart of where the power is - Punjab. Yet, the response one gets from officials in Punjab (as we heard during the siege at the GHQ and Manawan, near Lahore) is wide and clear - "We do not know of any camps operating in South Punjab", said Rana Sanaullah, one of the ministers in the provincial government there. Or maybe they do, but there is a visible reluctance in taking control of the situation. There is where, I say, there is a specific distinction they make when it comes to taking on these terrorists. Broad categories first, and not that they ain't known, anti-India (groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Hizbul Mujahideen - all umbrella groups, who are waging a supposed 'jihad' against India in Kashmir) groups, also described as those who do not fight the state, and hence no action against them, and you have groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Punjab (a broad conglomerate of terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahiba and the likes, who are taking on the State) and indeed, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in places like Waziristan or Malakand or Swat, where the Army is/was involved in flushing them out. If Pakistan continues to see terrorism and militancy as something heterogeneous - depending on it's usability, it might very well be seeing it's end - as an idea, as a concept and worse, as a country. If denial is the only way Pakistan wants to and chooses to live in, might as well wish them luck in that regard.

Secondly, it almost seems bashing India up for the problems in Pakistan has become an everyday affair - and now, it's coming from everywhere - be it the very articulate, or as the Daily Times editorial called him "the usually factual" Interior Minister Rehman Malik or Pakistan's Comical Ali/Baghdad Bob (as Foreign Policy labeled this honorable serviceman) - Maj Gen Athar Abbas, DG of the ISPR. It's almost become a very loose substitute for abdicating their own responsibility for their own people, appealing to their own domestic constituency, which still sees India as Pakistan's number one enemy and sketching itself as a victim of imported terror, rather than a state that exports it and most importantly, it paints a picture of every authority in that country living in a perennial state of denial. What it doesn't talk about is the human rights abuses committed by the armed forces in Balochistan, which might have equally fuelled insurgent rage against the State, (instead they prop up the Indian Army's role in Kashmir) and also, that it's heart i.e. Punjab has resorted to exploiting the Baloch resources, notably the gas-rich areas in that province. Even, as a matter of fact, the Balochi Regiment in the Pakistan Army consists of Punjabis, rather than the people it is named after. To blame India is supremely easy, but to reach out to the Balochis seems a responsibility, the Pakistani authorities don't want to undertake. Unfortunately, for Pakistan and Mr. Malik, no one buys these claims, not even Hillary Clinton.

What I hope, Pakistan do is get out of this cocoon of denial as soon as possible and take appropriate action against these miscreants for their own good. As Barack Obama used to repeatedly say about the Republicans in his campaign stumps, "It's not that they don't know about it, it's just that they just don't get it" - that phrase perhaps surmises the situation in Pakistan. If Pakistan is serious about wiping militancy and talking about this romantic image that the Zardaris and Gilanis paint about democracy, it's time they act, and act for their own good. Period.

The Baloch Conundrum

Okay. Like a cricket writer would put it - "India dominated the first two sessions of an opening day of a Test match against Pakistan and then collapsed in the final one." I don't know if I could apply this analogy to the events in Sharm-al-Sheikh, when events leading upto this Summit were undone by a second, irreversible version of the original Himalayan blunder back in 1949. One look at that rather shabbily drafted joint-statement and even a proverbial rocket scientist will tell you that it stank of concessions of grave proportions by India - lowering our posture in this diplomatic "I-will-not-talk-to-you-until-you..." standoff. What should stir everyone concerned about that joint statement, is not the language i.e. English, but it's most notable word - one word - Balochistan.

And, that one word is not yet a Frankenstein that could one day eat up South Block's policies, but even it's mention in a paper, not a "legal document" as some would argue, has put a largely ignored region of Pakistan into the world map. Yes, it will be equally foolish if New Delhi perennially lived in denial about it's possible involvement there, given the Ministry of External Affairs so proposterously came out with a statement, condoling Nawab Bugti, a Balochi insurgency leader's death in August 2006. Logic would say, it wasn't something we should have done, but that was the first sign when India seemed to lose the plot, and its Baloch policy came out in the open. As expected, the diplomatic circles played it down, but there were signs that India was up to some activity there. Then, the opening of not one, not two, FOUR embassies along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, probably gave it away. Again, not something we did with superior wisdom.

But, Balochistan intrigues me, it always has. I remember watching this rather shabbily shot documentary in Doordarshan (2002) about what Balochistan means to Pakistan vis-a-vis natural resources and how it has been exploited, not given its due by the various governments there. Fair enough. I mean, it accounts for 48% of oil and gas supply to Pakistan, and all it got in return was a dummy Prime Minister in the form of Zafarullah Khan Jamali. Again, a policy of appeasement recognizing the inflammability of the region, thanks to an insurgency which began in 2004 under the leadership of Akbar Bugti. Okay, now this begs me to ask the question, why should India involve itself in a region we don't even have geographical access to ? Bangladesh was logical, but Balochistan ? The old argument would have been to defeat the concept of Pakistan, it's idea and it's foundation. The newer argument smacks of a tit-for-tat, nothing else. If India thinks it's involvement in Balochistan is going to stop Pakistan from fueling more 'jihadis' in Kashmir, it is a foolish argument - one backed ever so least by common sense. On the contrary, it could and probably has increased the already existing anti-India sentiments within Pakistan, and gives our neighbours that one weapon to pin India down in many an international summit. Everytime we justifiedly talk about terrorism, or Ajmal Kasab, Pakistan could make up an Indian Kasab and bring it to the table. When we demand proof from them, they'll make up dossiers, not quite intending to punish India but just implicate India for acts they might/might not be involved in. Something for the South Block to think over.

My question is does India need Balochistan as much as Balochistan needs India ? It's again not rocket science to know that insurgencies look for funds, logistical support and covert backing. Do we even need to have a Balochistan policy ? If we ever had or have one, it's time to take our hands off it. I don't think India will benefit a great deal by involving itself in Balochistan, except to satisfy it's big-elephantine ego of "Hey, if you do this to us, we'll do this to you". It's time we realize that we're achieving zilch by even mentioning that word. If interfering in some other country's affairs gives us immense pleasure, sure, there's a reason for us to be involved. Close those embassies in Afghanistan, no one goes there and people who don't have the money to sustain themselves won't surely visit India. It's a virtual giveaway, simple.

Enough said, I rest my case here. The gist of all this, if you have had the patience to read it - is as my friend on twitter @thecomicproject would say, jab ungli karne nahin aata hai, kyon karte hai hum log ? (If you don't know to meddle, why do we even do it ?)